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INTRODUCTION
The proper standard for application of the First Amendment Es-
tablishment Clause continues to be a matter of sharp dispute. Dec-
ades after the Supreme Court attempted to dispose of issues such as
school prayer and government aid to religious schools, these matters
remain highly contested. While separationists have some quarrels
with current caselaw, most of the vocal criticism of the Court has
come from accommodationists, both within and outside of the
Court's own membership.
Accommodationists tend to argue that the Establishment Clause
bars only three types of government action: coercion (defined nar-
rowly) of religious belief or practice, favoritism of a preferred religion
over other denominations, and direct financial support of purely re-
ligious activity by religious bodies. In contrast, separationists contend
that the clause bars, at the very least, government endorsement of re-
ligious belief; favoritism not only towards a preferred religion but also
of religion in general, and a wider scope of financial assistance to re-
ligious groups.
Attempts to resolve this dispute unsurprisingly have invoked justi-
fications such as original intent, longstanding tradition, and underly-
ing constitutional themes. Little attention has been paid to the ap-
proach taken by the courts of other nations to the problem of
religious freedom. This is also unsurprising. Although the broad
concept of religious freedom has been widely endorsed by the inter-
national community, relatively few nations include a specific prohibi-
tion of religious establishment in their constitutional documents.
The United States Supreme Court, unlike the highest courts of some
other nations, has been extremely reluctant to turn to the jurispru-
dence of other countries for guidance on constitutional questions.
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But perhaps we ignore something significant when we choose to
interpret the scope of religious freedom and, in particular, its incor-
poration of the non-establishment principle, solely by focusing on the
American experience. This Article will explore how the recent expe-
rience of Canadian courts in interpreting the right of religious free-
dom contained in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms may
shed light on current American disputes over the religion clauses of
the First Amendment.
The Canadian Charter has no explicit non-establishment clause,
and yet Canadian courts have concluded that non-establishment
principles are implicit in the Charter's guarantee of religious free-
dom. This suggests that the common assumption of Americans, that
it is only the Establishment Clause that bars government support of
religion and that the values of the Establishment Clause and those of
the Free Exercise Clause are in tension, if not in conflict, is mis-
guided. Even if there were no Establishment Clause, it is likely that
American courts, like their Canadian counterparts, would be com-
pelled to recognize that non-establishment principles are an essential
component of the right to freely exercise religion.
Is, then, the Establishment Clause redundant, or does it serve in
some significant way to reinforce non-establishment values implicit in
the Free Exercise Clause? When Canadian courts find non-
establishment values in a Charter of Rights that lacks an explicit es-
tablishment clause and protect those values more rigorously than
strong accommodationists would enforce those non-establishment
values under the First Amendment, should that serve as strong evi-
dence that the accommodationist position is inadequate? This Arti-
cle will attempt to address these questions.
Part I of this Article will briefly summarize the history and current
state of the Supreme Court's religion clause jurisprudence. Part II
will discuss the recognition, in the latter part of the twentieth cen-
tury, of religious freedom as a basic right by international bodies, par-
ticularly those sharing with the United States a commitment to en-
forcing human rights. Part III will then focus specifically on the
experience of Canadian courts in interpreting the Charter guarantee
of religious freedom in cases that American courts would classify as
presenting Establishment Clause concerns. Finally, Part IV will dis-
cuss the insights that American courts might draw from these Cana-
dian cases in approaching First Amendment cases.
I. APPROACHES TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT RELIGION CLAUSES: A
BRIEF HISTORY
The United States Supreme Court has wrestled with the scope and
application of both the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses for
decades. In neither case has the Court been able to develop an en-
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during consensus among the justices. Instead, the Court has strug-
gled to balance the desire for some level of determinacy against both
the difficulty of doing so where first principles remain hotly contested
and the attractions of case-by-case balancing. A brief overview of the
Court's history in dealing with each of the religion clauses will help
us to understand the current state of the debate.
A. The Establishment Clause
Perhaps the persistent disagreement of the justices conceming
the proper application of the Establishment Clause should not be
surprising. Legal historians have noted that eighteenth century
Americans supported the non-establishment principle for a number
of distinctly different reasons.1 Some feared that a religious estab-
lishment would threaten individual freedom; others feared that gov-
ernment support would ultimately threaten religion, by subordinat-
ing it to government control.2 And since the First Amendment was
originally a limit only on the national govemment, some who sup-
ported state religious establishments favored the clause because it
would prevent Congress from overriding their local establishment
with a different, national religion.3
In addition, it is clear that the authors of the clause were not
drawing upon some clearly defined common law or internationally
recognized concept. While the concept of freedom of religion, in the
sense of toleration, antedated the First Congress,4 non-establishment
as an independent principle was something quite new and rare.5 In-
I See, e.g., Arlin M. Adams and CharlesJ. Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty, 137 U. PA.
L REV. 1559 (1989); Donald L. Drakeman, Religion and the Republic: James Madison and the First
Amendment, 25J. CHURCH & ST. 427 (1983); Carol Weisbrod, On Evidences and Intentions: "The
MoreProof, the MoreDoubt, "18 CONN. L. REV. 803 (1986).
2 Thus, we can contrast the views of Thomas Jefferson, who feared that orthodox religious
believers would insist on political power to the detriment of individual rights, seeWALTER BERNS,
THE FIRSTAMENDMENrAND THE FUIURE OFAMERICAN DEMOCRACY 20-29 (1976), with adherents
of the views of Roger Williams, who favored separation of church and state in order to protect
the churches themselves from outside corrupting influence, see Timothy L. Hall, Roger Williams
and the Foundations of Religious Liberty, 71 B.U. L. REV. 455 (1991).
3 Several New England states maintained elements of a religious establishment at the time
of the ratification of the Bill of Rights, and for decades thereafter. See GERARD V. BRADLEY,
CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS INAMERICA 20-26 (1987).
4 Professor Cole Durham notes that "[a]s early as the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the right
to religious liberty was afforded international protection. By the late 18th Century, religious
liberty was afforded protection in a number of path breaking statutes .... " W. Cole Durham,
Jr., Perspectives on Religious Liberty: A Comparative Framework, in 2 RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE- LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 1 (Johan D. van der Vyver & John Witte, Jr., eds.
1996).
Even today, in western countries that adhere to the concept of religious freedom, many
contend that this concept is not inconsistent with an established church. See infra notes 129-33
and accompanying text.
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deed, as we will see in Part II, even today, non-establishment is rarely
considered an essential part of a regime of human rights, although
some variant of the free exercise principle is.6
The First Amendment was not incorporated into the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and escaped explicit applica-
tion to the states until well into the twentieth century. Government
action in support of religion had been much more likely to arise at
the state and local levels, rather than the national level in the United
States. Thus, prior to 1947, the United States Supreme Court ad-
dressed the Establishment Clause in only two cases, neither of which
had a substantial impact on subsequent law.8 Some state courts
handed down significant decisions interpreting non-establishment
provisions of their state constitutions during this period,9 but in light
of differences in the language and the history of each of these provi-
sions,1° it would be difficult, and almost certainly deceptive, to try to
formulate a consensus position of state courts in the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries on the question of what a non-establishment
principle actually entailed.
Still, keeping in mind the dangers of oversimplification, we can
detect some general trends. At the beginning of the nineteenth cen-
tury, several states continued to explicitly recognize one denomina-
6 See infra notes 107-33 and accompanying text.
7 It was not until Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), that the Supreme Court stated, in
a case presenting free speech issues, that the First Amendment protections would be incorpo-
rated into the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and applied to the states. See id. at
666. The Court did not apply the Establishment Clause to the states until 1947, in Everson v.
Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
8 In Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899), the Court upheld federal government aid to a
hospital in the District of Columbia that was owned and operated by a Catholic religious order.
The Court held that the hospital was chartered as a nonprofit corporation to care for the sick,
that there was "nothing sectarian" in its charter, that this was "simply the case of a secular cor-
poration being managed by people who hold to the doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church,"
and that therefore, government aid did not violate the Establishment Clause. See id. at 298-299.
In Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908), the Court permitted expenditure of Indian tribal
funds, given to the tribe by the federal government under treaty obligations, to support relig-
ious schools chosen by the tribe. The decision stressed that the Indians had treaty rights to the
funds, and the tribe, not the federal government, made the decision of how to use them. See id.
at 80-82.
9 E.g., Trost v. Ketteler Manual Training Sch. for Boys, 118 N.E. 743 (Ill. 1918) (state aid to
reform school run by Catholic organization did not violate Illinois constitution); State ex reL
Nevada Orphan Asylum v. Hallock, 16 Nev. 373 (Nev. 1882) (state aid to Catholic orphanage
did violate Nevada constitution); Weiss v. District Bd., 44 N.W. 967 (Wis. 1890) (prayer in public
schools violates Wisconsin constitution); Wilkerson v. City of Rome, 110 S.E. 895 (Ga. 1921)
(prayer in public schools does not violate Georgia constitution).
10 For an overview of early decisions under the non-establishment provisions of state consti-
tutions, see CHESIERJ. ANTIEAU, PHILLIP M. CARROLL & THOMAS C. BURKE, RELIGION UNDER
THE STATE CONSITUTIONS 1-64 (1965).
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tion as established, although others would be tolerated." As the cen-
tury progressed, the single established church became extinct,12 but it
was quite common for states to favor Christian denominations or in-
dividuals over non-Christians.13 By the end of the century, the norm
was equal treatment for all religions, but favoritism of religion in
general over irreligion was considered unremarkable.
4
Against this historical background, the Supreme Court took its
first significant steps into the Establishment Clause quagmire in the
late 1940s. When a sharply divided Court in Everson v. Board of Educa-
tioni5 upheld the New Jersey practice of providing school bus service
to parochial, as well as public school students, the apparently ac-
commodationist result may have been less important than the ringing
separationist language in which it was couched. Writing for the
Court, Justice Black drew heavily on the writings of Jefferson and
other Virginia anti-establishment figures to conclude that the core of
the Establishment Clause was the maintenance of a "wall of separa-
tion."16
That wall, according to Black, meant "at least" that "[n] either a
state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one relig-
ion over another."7 Insofar as it addressed preference for one relig-
ion over another, this statement seems entirely consistent with prin-
ciples that, while once disputed, had gained general acceptance by
the twentieth century. But the clause condemning aid to "all relig-
ions" as against irreligion, was much more controversial.
While all justices endorsed this approach of strict neutrality, they
were sharply divided on its application. A coroliary of the require-
ment that religion not be privileged is that it also not be disadvan-
taged. While four dissenters saw the provision of bus transportation
as improper "aid" to religion, Justice Black and the majority saw it as
n For a discussion of the various approaches that states took toward religious establishments
and the different definitions of the term that they employed during the revolutionary period,
see THONJASJ. CURRY, THE FIRSTFREEDOMIS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMIECATO THE PASSAGE OF
THEFIRSrAMENDrMENT 134-92 (1986).
12 Connecticut, in 1818, and Massachusetts, in 1833, were the final states to abandon gov-
ernment preference for a single denomination. See ANSON PHELPS STOKES & LEO PFEFFER,
CHURCHAND STATE INTHE UNiTED STATES 73-78 (rev. one-vol. ed. 1964).
13 Thus, Joseph Story maintained that the religion clauses did not mean "to countenance,
much less to advance Mahometanism, or Judaism, or infidelity... but to exclude all rivalry
among Christian sects." 3JOSEPHSTORY COMMENTARIESONTHECONSITIuFrIONOFTHEUNITED
STATES 728 (1833).
H As late as 1961, Maryland required officeholders to affirm "belief in the existence of God,"
a requirement that was found unconstitutional in Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 489 (1961).
330 U.S. 1 (1947).
16 Id at 16. Jefferson's letter to the Danbury Baptist Association, which contained the wall
metaphor, is quoted at length in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).
17 Everson, 330 U.S. at 15.
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no different than having the police and fire departments protect
church property as they protect all other property.8 In other words,
the buses served to further, rather than to undermine, government
neutrality.' 9
The difficulty of fixing the boundary between neutrality and favor-
itism would continue to play a significant role in religion clause juris-
prudence.2° The most lasting legacy of Everson would be the confi-
dent assertion that government must maintain a strict neutrality, not
merely among religions, but between religion in general and irrelig-
ion. Some would object to this assertion, claiming that it went well
21beyond the intentions of the eighteenth century Framers. Yet, it
might also be argued that strict neutrality among religions was not
clearly what the Framers had in mind either. Few of those men
would be shocked by government action that preferred Christianity
over other faiths.2 But by the mid-twentieth century, and surely to-
day, few would question that the Establishment Clause commands, at
least, equal treatment of all faiths. Everson, then, can be seen as a fur-
ther step in the evolutionary expansion of our understanding of the
meaning of non-establishment. Everson was not the first departure
from the views of the First Congress, but rather one that, rightly or
wrongly, built upon earlier changes.
After Everson, the Court handed down two decisions dealing with
school district policies of "release time" for public school students to
attend weekly religious instruction.2 The cases held-that such release
time programs were impermissible where the instruction took place
18 "Of course, cutting off church schools from these services, so separate and so indisputably
marked off from the religious function, would make it far more difficult for the schools to op-
erate. But such is obviously not the purpose of the First Amendment.... State power is no
more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them." Il at 18.
19 id-
20 See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 226 (1997) (holding that the state may send pub-
lic school teachers into religious schools to provide secular services under Title I of the Elemen-
tary and Secondary Education Act of 1965); Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 862
(1995) (ruling that a state university may not deny funding to a student publication on grounds
of its religious content); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981) (holding that neutrality
requires that a state university allow religious student groups equal access to its facilities). In
each of these cases, several justices filed vigorous dissenting opinions.
21 See, e.g., Robert L. Cord, Founding Intentions and the Establishment Clause: Harmonizing Ac-
commodation and Separation, 10 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 47 (1987); Philip B. Kurland, The Origins
of the Religion Clauses of the Constitution, 27 WM. & MARYL. REV. 839, 856 (1986) ("I am hard put
to find any evidence in the development of legal protection for religious freedom that indicates
any intention to protect atheists.").
ForJustice Story's views, see STORY, supra note 13.
23 See Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (holding that release time did not violate Es-
tablishment Clause when religious instruction occurred outside of school grounds); McCollum
v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (finding that release time violated the Establishment
Clause because religious classes were conducted in regular schoolrooms in the school build-
ing).
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on public school premises,24 but permissible when students left the
public facility to receive religious instruction.25 This pragmatic com-
promise on the issue, together with some accommodationist language
in the latter case,26 seemed to soften the rigid separationist tone of
Everson. Neither of these cases, however, set forth any framework to
apply in future Establishment Clause cases. Nor did either of these
cases arouse the firestorm of opposition that would arise following
the Court's next foray into the Establishment Clause thicket.
In the early 1960s, the Supreme Court held that public school
sponsored, organized prayer2 and daily, devotional Bible reading
were practices that violated the Establishment Clause, notwithstand-
ing the fact that individual students could be excused,2 and the fact
that, in the case of the daily prayer, care was taken to make the prayer
as nondenominational and inoffensive as possible. ° These cases,
which set off a firestorm of protest and decades of local attempts to
overturn or skirt their holdings,31 also were the first to articulate a
standard for application in all Establishment Clause cases. In order
to survive an Establishment Clause challenge, held the Court, a stat-
ute or practice must have a secular purpose (although that need not
be its only purpose) and must not have as its primary effect the ad-
vancement of religion.?
Later in the decade, the Court's Establishment Clause focus
shifted from the presence of religion in public schools to attempts by
several states to provide forms of aid to private religious schools. In
24 See McCollum, 333 U.S. at 203 (involving religious training on public school premises).
See Zorach, 343 U.S. at 306 (involving the practice of releasing students during the school
day to receive religious instruction outside of the public school).
25Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, stated: "We are a religious people whose institu-
tions presuppose a Supreme Being .... When the state encourages religious instruction or co-
operates with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian needs,
it follows the best of our traditions." Id. at 313-14. Zorach, of course, is another example of the
difficult task of draing the line between neutrality and favoritism.
7 SeeEngel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
SeeAbington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
See Enge4 370 U.S. at 42-24; see also Schempp, 374 U.S. at 205.
so The prayer at issue, crafted by the New York State Board of Regents, was "Almighty God,
we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents,
our teachers and our Country." Enge 370 U.S. at 422. The Court found that government actu-
ally composing an official prayer was an act reminiscent of classic religious establishments. See
id. at 425-26.
31 Over 150 proposals to amend the Constitution to permit school prayer have been intro-
duced in Congress. See Geoffrey R. Stone, In Opposition to the School Prayer Amendment, 50 U. CHI.
L. REV. 823, 826 (1983). See also Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (invali-
dating practice of religious invocations prior to public high school football games); Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (invalidating practice of school sponsored religious invocations
at public high school graduation ceremonies); Wallace v.Jaffiree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (striking
down the "moment of silence" requirement because its purpose was to promote religion).
22 See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222.
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1968, the Court, following Everson, held that states could adopt a pro-
gram of loaning textbooks in secular subjects such as math and sci-
ence to students attending religious schools.33 The purpose and pri-
mary effect of these programs, the Court held, was to advance
education in these secular areas of knowledge.3 Encouraged by this
decision, Rhode Island and Pennsylvania went further, enacting pro-
grams that would provide state money to supplement the salaries of
the teachers of these secular subjects who were employed by private
religious schools.35
The Court, however, drew a line between these programs and ear-
lier cases, and in doing so, framed the enduring three-part test for Es-
tablishment Clause cases. In Lemon v. Kurtzman,36 the Court began its
analysis with the two-part test applied in earlier cases. While the sal-
ary supplements could easily be seen to be motivated by the goal of
furthering education in secular subjects, the effect part of the test was
more troubling. While the primary effect of a textbook could be
measured by its contents, a live teacher, partially supported by state
funds, might inject substantial doses of religious doctrine into any
subject matter. Anticipating this, the states had provided for gov-
ernment monitoring of the performance of state-supported teachers
to assure that they stuck close to their secular areas of expertise.&s
But this effort to assure compliance with the "secular effect"
prong of the test created a new problem. In the 1970 case of Walz v.
Tax Commission of New York, 39 in upholding the practice of granting
tax exemptions to religious as well as other charitable property,
against an Establishment Clause challenge, ° the Court stressed that
the First Amendment also forbade "excessive government entangle-
ment" with religious organizations. 41 This would serve to prohibit not
only such things as governments delegating power to religious or-
ganizations, but also excessive supervision of religion by government.
See Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
M See id. at 243-47.
See RI. GEN. LAWS § 16-51-1 et seq. (1970); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 5601-5609 (1971).
403 U.S. 602 (1971).
3 "We need not and do not assume that teachers in parochial schools will be guilty of bad
faith .... We simply recognize that a dedicated religious person, teaching in a school affiliated
with his or her faith and operated to inculcate its tenets, will inevitably experience great diffi-
culty in remaining religiously neutral." Id. at 618.
38 See id. at 619-21.
397 U.S. 664 (1970).
40 The New York State Constitution authorized tax exemptions for "real or personal prop-
erty used exclusively for religious, educational or charitable purposes... not operating for
profit." Id. at 666-67 (quoting N.Y. CONSr. art. XVI, § 1).
41 Id at 674. The Court found that "[e]limination of exemption would tend to expand the
involvement of government by giving rise to tax valuation of church property, tax liens, tax
foreclosures, and the direct confrontations and conflicts that follow .... " Id
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This requirement was added to the purpose and effect inquiries to
form what would become known as the three-part Lemon test. In
Lemon itself, the salary supplements could not stand. If extensively
supervised, the program would fail the entanglement inquiry; while if
unsupervised, the state could not establish that the primary effect of
the work of subsidized teachers would be secular.
42
Over the years, the Lemon test has not provided a great deal of
predictability to Establishment Clause cases. Each of its three inquir-
ies, especially the question of how to classify the primary effect of a
government action, is sufficiently open-ended to make outcomes at
least arguably unpredictable, and perhaps even inconsistent. 43 Sepa-
rationists would object to decisions that applied the Lemon test less
rigorously." But in recent years, the most vigorous opposition to
Lemon has come from the accommodationist side.4 This criticism has
often challenged the basic assumptions, dating back to Everson, on
which the Lemon test was based.
A series of Establishment Clause cases beginning in the mid-1980s
gave several justices the opportunity to critique the Lemon test, and
put forward refinements or alternative approaches. Some justices
continued to apply Lemon without much elaboration upon the test;
for the most part, these justices took relatively strong separationist
positions.4 But strong separationism did not consistently prevail.
42 "A comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance will inevitably be re-
quired to ensure that... the First Amendment [is) ... respected .... These prophylactic con-
tacts will involve excessive and enduring entanglement between state and church." Lemon, 403
U.S. at 619.
43 This was especially true in cases involving state aid to religious schools. Compare Levitt v.
Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973) (holding that the state may not
reimburse religious schools for the cost of administering state-mandated but teacher-prepared
tests) with Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980) (holding
that the state may reimburse religious schools for the cost of administering state-mandated and
state-prepared tests); compare Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (holding that a state
may furnish free text books to public and parochial school children) with Wolman v. Walter,
433 U.S. 229 (1977) (finding that a state may not lend maps or audio-visual equipment to
church-related schools).
See, e.g., Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 689-97 (1971) (Douglas, J., joined by Black
and Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (disagreeing with the Court's less rigorous application of the
Lemon test in a case involving higher education); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist. 509 U.S.
1, 14-24 (1993) (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
The most acerbic accommodationist criticism of Lemon comes, not surprisingly, from Jus-
tice Scaia, who has written that the Lemon test is like "some ghoul in a late-night horror movie
that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and bur-
ied .... When we wish to strike down a practice it forbids, we invoke it... when we wish to up-
hold a practice it forbids, we ignore it entirely." See Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free
Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398-99 (1993) (ScaliaJ., concurring) (citations omitted).
46 See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (striking down a state requirement that
students be taught "creation science" as having no secular purpose); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S.
39 (1980) (striking down as having no secular purpose a state requirement that each public
school classroom post a copy of the Ten Commandments).
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Separationist outcomes depended on the votes of centrist justices,
particularly Justice O'Connor. Beginning with Lynch v. Donnelly,47 in
which a divided Court upheld the constitutionality of a city-sponsored
Christmas display that included, among other things, a creche, Justice
O'Connor put forward what, in her view, was not an alternative to
Lemon, but rather a more focused way of applying the test, particu-
larly, the crucial second step. In determining whether the primary
effect of a government practice was religious, according to Justice
O'Connor, the central inquiry should be whether a well-informed
outside observer would conclude that by engaging in this challenged
activity, government was endorsing religion, or instead merely recog-
nizing its presence in the community.48 Significantly, this "non-
endorsement" test does not challenge the basic premise of the Ever-
son-Lemon line of cases-that is, that the Establishment Clause goes
beyond prohibiting favoritism among religions to prohibit favoritism
of religion in general.
Much has been written both in support and opposition to Justice
O'Connor's non-endorsement test.49  In recent years, justices who
support this test have provided the crucial swing votes necessary to
gain a majority for either the adherents of strong forms of separation-
ism, or strong forms of accommodation. But this Article will focus
more on the views of those Justices who have rejected not merely the
non-endorsement test, but the entire Lemon framework, and to some
extent, the view of the Establishment Clause put forward in Everson
itself.
To these accommodationist justices, most notably Justice Scalia,
the entire Lemon framework can and should be discarded, and re-
placed with two or three allegedly more focused and determinate
questions. First, and perhaps most prominently, Justice Scalia would
ask not whether the government practice in question endorses relig-
ion, but rather whether it goes so far as to coerce anyone's religious
47 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
43 "Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members
of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders,
favored members of the political community. Disapproval sends the opposite message" It. at
688 (O'ConnorJ, concurring).
49 See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, Mhen Is Religious Speech Not "Free Speech"?, 2000 U. ILL L. REV. 379
(supporting the non-endorsement test); Arnold H. Loewy, Rethinking Government Neutrality To-
wards Religion Under the Establishment Clause: The Untapped Potential ofJustice O'Connor's Insight, 64
N.C. L. REV. 1049 (1986) (supporting the non-endorsement test); Michael W. McConnell, Relig-
ious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115 (1992) (criticizing the non-endorsement
test); Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the
"No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266 (1987) (criticizing the non-endorsement test).
50 See, e.g., Capital Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 772-83 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., joined by Souter and Breyer, JJ., concurring). See also County of Allegheny v.
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989), and infra notes 57-58.
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belief or practice.' If a practice is non-coercive, it would run afoul of
the Establishment Clause only if it privileges one religion, or subset of
religions, over another.52 In other words, this view essentially rejects
the notion, initially set forth in Everson, that religion in general may
not be favored over irreligion.53
The accommodationist framework may also have a third compo-
nent, although the precise boundaries of this component are less
clear. It has long been assumed that the Establishment Clause pro-
hibits government from providing direct financial assistance to relig-
ious organizations for the performance of purely religious activity.
But this principle is so well understood, and the instances in which
government has sought to aid religious organizations have so over-
whelmingly involved situations where the organizations were per-
forming an activity with both secular and religious effects, that this
"no direct aid" principle seems not to offend most accommodation-
ists.55 Accommodationists, however, are much more likely to permit
aid to religious organizations where the aid arguably has both secular
and religious effects.
Advocates of the non-coercion test would contend that it better
reflects the original intent of the Establishment Clause,5 but would
also stress that it would seem to provide much more predictability
than either the unadorned Lemon test, or the non-endorsement prin-
ciple. Yet this clarity may be largely illusory; is the concept of coer-
cion really more precise than the concept of endorsement? Justice
Kennedy wrote in favor of the non-coercion principle in County of Al-
legheny v. ACLU,57 arguing that neither the presence of a creche in the
lobby of the Allegheny County Courthouse, or a menorah in a public
51 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 640-42 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia
would limit the scope of objectionable coercion to government "acts backed by threat of pen-
alty." Id. at 642.5
2"And I will further concede that our constitutional tradition... has... ruled out of order
government-sponsored endorsement of religion ... where the endorsement is sectarian, in the
sense of specifying details upon which men and women who believe in a benevolent, omnipo-
tent Creator and Ruler of the world are known to differ (for example, the divinity of Christ)."
Id- at 641. Justice Souter presents historical evidence that the Establishment Clause should not
be limited to prohibiting nonpreferential state support of religion. Id. at 612-18 (Souter, J.,
concurring).
See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
SeeEverson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 10-16 (1947).
5 Thus, Justice Scalia states that he "will... acknowledge for the sake of argument
that... by 1790 the term 'establishment' had acquired an additional meaning-'financial sup-
port of religion generally, by public taxation'...." Lee, 505 U.S. at 641 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., id. at 632-36 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
57 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
Apr. 2002]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
park outside the Courthouse was coercive, and that neither, in his
view, was impermissible.
2
But shortly after County of Allegheny, Justice Kennedy provided the
deciding vote in Lee v. Weisman,59 in which the Court held that a
school-sponsored religious invocation at public high school gradua-
ion ceremonies violated the Establishment Clause. While Justice
Scalia and other accommodationists could find nothing coercive
about this practice, Justice Kennedy found the atmosphere to be psy-
chologically coercive, and joined with the Court's non-endorsement
bloc. Coercion, then, has multiple possible meanings, perhaps as
many as endorsement. At the very least, Lee illustrates that, at least in
some cases and to some justices, there may be little difference be-
tween the tests.
Thus, the proper approach to the Establishment Clause is cur-
rently highly contested. Although the strong separationist sentiments
echoed in Everson still have some support on the Supreme Court,
contemporary debate has largely focused on the choice of either the
non-endorsement approach to Lemon, or the replacement of Lemon
with the non-coercion standard. This Article, rather than asking the
perhaps unanswerable question of which approach more accurately
reflects original intent, will explore one practical aspect of the possi-
ble adoption of the non-coercion test and the rest of the accommoda-
tionist position will it render the Establishment Clause largely or en-
tirely redundant? In order to approach that question, it will first be
necessary to take note of the First Amendment's other command re-
garding religion, the Free Exercise Clause.
B. The Free Exercise Clause
The Free Exercise Clause, like the Establishment Clause, received
little attention in the Supreme Court before the middle of the twen-
tieth century. In two late nineteenth century cases,6' the Court faced
the question of whether the Free Exercise Clause would protect
Mormon polygamists from criminal or other punishment under the
law governing pre-statehood western territories.6 In rejecting the po-
Id. at 663-68 (KennedyJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Court held that
the menorah, placed in a public park, did not violate the Establishment Clause, but that the
display of a creche in the county courthouse was such a violation. See id. at 621.
59 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
60 Id at 592-94.
61 Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
In Reynolds, the defendant was convicted of bigamy. See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 146. Davis in-
volved an Idaho territorial statute that went even further, requiring that all voters take an oath
swearing that they were neither polygamists nor advocates of polygamy. See Davis, 133 U.S. at
334. Davis was convicted of conspiring with other Mormons to falsely take the oath. See id. at
335.
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lygamists' claims, the Court drew a distinction that would survive for
decades. The Free Exercise Clause, it held, was meant to protect be-
lief and expression of belief, but did not require the government to
grant religious believers an exemption from laws regulating actions
that could reasonably be applied to the community as a whole.6
Religious believers achieved several victories before the 1960s, but
each of these victories could easily be explained without reference to
the Free Exercise Clause. Pierce v. Society of Sistersr and Meyer v. Ne-
braska,65 establishing the right of parents to choose a private educa-
tion for their children, could be seen as vindication of a right of pa-
rental or familial autonomy. Cases establishing the right of minority
religions to preach in public, 6 or the right to exercise a religious-
based refusal to salute the flag,67 could be decided simply by refer-
ence to the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.
But the 1960s saw the emergence of a much stronger Free Exer-
cise Clause. In Sherbert v. Verner,68 the Court held that a state could
not deny unemployment benefits to an applicant who refused em-
ployment that would require work on Saturday, which would violate
her Seventh Day Adventists principles.69 The Court held that where a
claimant could show that the application of a law seriously infringed
upon the practice of her religion, the state would be required to pro-
vide an exemption unless it could show that denying the exemption
was necessary to achieve the compelling interest behind the statute or
practice. 7° In other words, a free exercise claim would require that
the government action be subjected to "strict scrutiny.,
71
The high-water mark for application of the Free Exercise Clause
was the Supreme Court's decision in Wisconsin v. Yoder7 in 1972. The
Court held that the Wisconsin statute requiring school attendance
until the age of 16, in effect requiring two years of high school, could
63 The Court stated that, pursuant to the First Amendment, "Congress was deprived of all
legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions which were in violation of
social duties or subversive of good order." Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164. The Court continued,
"Laws ... cannot interfere with mere religions belief and opinions, [but] they may with prac-
tices." Id. at 166.
& 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (reversing the breach of peace convic-
tion of aJehovah's Witness minister on First Amendment grounds).
bWest Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
6 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
69 1&at 399-400.
,0 Id. at 406-09.
71 The concept of strict scrutiny has been most thoroughly developed in cases involving
claims that government has violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSmTuTONAL LAW § 16-6, at 1451-74 (2d
ed. 1988).
7 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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not be enforced against the Old Order Amish, who objected to for-
mal education beyond the eighth grade on the grounds that high
school promoted values that were destructive of the Amish religious
community. 3 In light of the history of the Amish community, and its
success in providing practical, post-elementary school education to its
children, sufficient to make them productive members of that com-
munity, and not burdens to society at large, the Court held that de-
nial of the exemption was not necessary to achieve the admittedly
compelling interest of the state in assuring an educated citizenry.74
In the years following Yoder, the Court backed away from vigorous
free exercise enforcement. Throughout the rest of the 1970s and
1980s, the Court applied the language of strict scrutiny to a series of
free exercise claims, but in sharp contrast to the widespread view that
strict scrutiny leads to almost inevitable invalidation of the govern-
ment act in question, not a single post-Yoder Supreme Court decision
found a Free Exercise Clause violation. While some of these cases
could be said to present instances where an exemption could seri-
ously threaten the government interest involved,5 other cases pre-
sented situations where the state interest seemed less than compel-
ling76 or where denial of the exemption seemed hardly likely to• 77
seriously impair the government interest.
This apparent tension between the Court's strict scrutiny language
and its deference to government interests in free exercise cases was
resolved by the majority of the justices by abandoning the Sherbert
framework in Employment Division v. Smith.' ° Writing for the Court,
Justice Scalia held that strict scrutiny would be appropriate only
where a free exercise claim was combined with some additional con-
73 The Court in Wisconsin v. Yoderwrote:
The high school tends to emphasize intellectual and scientific accomplishments, self-
distinction, competitiveness, worldly success, and social life with other students. Amish
society emphasizes informal learning-through-doing; a life of 'goodness' rather than a
life of intellect; wisdom, rather than technical knowledge; community welfare, rather
than competition; and separation from, rather than integration with, contemporary
worldly society.
Id at 211.
74 Id. at 221-29.
E.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (holding that an exemption from obliga-
tion to pay social security tax would threaten continued existence of the Social Security system);
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (holding that conscientious objector status ex-
empting one from military draft on the basis of opposition to a particular war, rather than gen-
eral pacifist conviction, would threaten administration of selective service system).
,6 See, e.g., Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (hold-
ing that a state interest in regulating flow of crowds at state fair justifies absolute ban on solicita-
tion of funds except from fixed booths).
77 See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (holding that an exemption from
military dress code regulations permitting an orthodox Jewish officer to wear a yarmulke while
indoors would threaten compelling government interests).
1 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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stitutional rights claim, as in Yoder's combination of free exercise and
family autonomy concerns, 9 or when the statute or practice in ques-
tion was not a generally applicable law addressing a legitimate gov-
ernment concern, but rather was targeted at a particular religious
practice because of its religious aspects.
Smith was greeted with widespread disapproval. Several Justices
dissented,"' and have continued to maintain that the decision is mis-
guided.2 Congress attempted to restore pre-Smith strict scrutiny
through enactment of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,0 but
that act, at least insofar as it applied to free exercise claims brought
against states and their subdivisions,84 was declared unconstitutional
by the Supreme Court as an improper exercise of its power to enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment.8' A number of states have, in the wake
of Smith, declared that their state constitution guarantee of religious
freedom requires that strict scrutiny be applied to any application of
state law that imposes a significant burden on a religious practice.s
Id at 881-83. Of course, where free exercise concerns are present in addition to other
concerns, such as family autonomy or free speech, it is not clear why the free exercise claim is
anything more than redundant.
The Smith principle applies to cases "involving a neutral, generally applicable regulatory
law." Id at 880. In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, the Court struck down
a city's ban on ritual slaughter of animals, finding it to have been targeted specifically at the
religious aspects of the act, rather than at genuine, secular concerns. See Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
81 Justices Blackmun, Brennan and Marshall dissented in Smith. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 907-21
(Blackmun,J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor, while concurring in the result, disagreed with the
Court's rationale, and would, along with the dissenters, have applied strict scrutiny. See id. at
891-907 (O'ConnorJ., concurring).
82 See Church of Lukumi Babulu Aye 508 U.S. at 577-80, where Justice Blackmun andJustice
O'Connor reaffirm their disagreement with the Smith standard. In the same case, Justice
Souter, who was not on the Court in 1990, expressed his discomfort with the Smith standard. See
id. at 559-77 (Souter, J., concurring). See also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 544-65
(1997) (O'ConnorJ., dissenting); and id. at 565-66 (SouterJ., dissenting).
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, et seq. (1994). The Act would require courts to grant free exercise
exemptions where the claimant could demonstrate a substantial burden on religious exercise,
unless the government could show that the burden was the least restrictive means of furthering
a compelling government interest.
81 The Act was to apply to any part of the federal government and also to any state or subdi-
vision of a state. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2. Congressjustified its power to apply the Act to states
and their subdivisions by reference to its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
in order to enforce guarantees against the states. See ores, 521 U.S. at 516-17.
See FRores, 521 U.S. at 536. The Court limited congressional power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to enforcing rights as defined by the Court, rather than establishing
the scope or definition of the rights themselves.
See generally Tracey Levy, Comment, Rediscovering Rights: State Courts Reconsider the Free Exer-
cise Clauses of Their Own Constitutions in the Wake of Employment Div. v. Smith, 67 TEMPLEL. REV.
1017 (1994). Congress also responded to Rores by enacting a narrower religious freedom act,
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc
(2000). The Act calls for strict scrutiny where a challenger to a land use regulation or a prison
rule establishes that such a rule or regulation substantially impairs a substantial burden on relig-
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Still, Smith remains as controlling precedent for the First Amend-
ment Free Exercise Clause. While some government action will vio-
late the Smith standard, 87 the current free exercise standards give gov-
ernment far more leeway in denying religious-based exemptions from
generally applicable laws. Thus, those seeking such exemptions can
be expected to approach the legislature, rather than the courts. At
this point, the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses come to-
gether in an interesting fashion. Does an exemption from a generally
applicable law on religious grounds create significant Establishment
Clause problems? Prior to Smith, a negative response to this question
could easily be based upon the government's compelling interest to
avoid violating free exercise rights. But with exemptions no longer
compelled by the Free Exercise Clause it becomes more difficult to
reconcile a robust Establishment Clause with such legislative exemp-
tions. Justice Scalia's opinion in Smith made it quite clear that he ex-
pected religious believers to seek and often gain legislative exemp-
tions;88 clearly he sees nothing in the Establishment Clause to cast• 89
constitutional doubt on such exemptions. But this does create a
situation that is troubling. Religions with large followings will surely
find a more receptive legislature when they seek accommodation;
minority religions will have a harder time rallying public and legisla-
tive support. Does such a result violate what almost all would con-
cede to be a core principle of non-establishment, that at the very
least, government may not prefer one religion over another?
This illustrates the clear connection between the non-
establishment principle and the free exercise principle, but at the
same time, illustrates the tendency of American courts to treat the
two religion clauses of the First Amendment as presenting separate,
distinct issues. Does this tendency to classify a religious freedom
question as belonging to one, but not the other, of the clauses per-
haps contribute to the current state of dissatisfaction with religion
clause jurisprudence? When we look beyond the borders of the
United States, we will see a growing sensitivity to issues of religious
ious exercise. Id. By narrowing the focus of the Act to land use regulation, which implicates
Article I of the Commerce Clause, and protection of the rights of the institutionalized, which is
already a matter of federal concern, the supporters of this statute attempt to avoid the problem
in Hores. See lores, 521 U.S. at 536.
8 See Church ofLukumi Babulu Aye, 508 U.S. at 520.
"[A] society that believes in the [First Amendment] protection accorded to religious be-
lief can be expected to be solicitous of that value in its legislation as well .... But to say that a
nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption is permitted, or even that it is desirable, is not
to say that it is constitutionally required .... " Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
o"It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process will place at a
relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but that unavoid-
able consequence of democratic government must be preferred to a system in which each con-
science is a law unto itself .... " Id
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freedom in much of the international community, but for the most
part, this concern is expressed without the explicit expression of a
non-establishment principle. Does this mean that non-establishment
values are not respected?
II. FREEDOM OF RELIGION: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
Governments can take a wide variety of positions on the proper
relationship between religion and the state. Professor W. Cole Dur-
ham has provided a very useful catalog of these different ap-
proaches.9 At one extreme, there are nations with a single estab-
lished church. This group may be subdivided into those that do not
tolerate competing faiths, those that tolerate some, but not all, com-
peting churches, and those that, while maintaining an establishment,
guarantee, allow for full religious freedom for all other faiths.91
Closely related to the more tolerant examples of established churches
are what Durham labels "endorsed churches." Here the constitution
will "falljust short of formally affirming that one particular church is
the official church of a nation, but acknowledges that one particular
church has a special place in the country's traditions."' ' Despite for-
mal endorsement of one church, others will be entitled to equal
treatment.
93
Durham's next category consists of "cooperationist regimes."94 No
religion will be formally endorsed, but government will, instead, co-
operate with religious organizations, often with state funding.95 But,
as Durham points out, the widely varying size of denominations, and
their different needs and activities, can often lead to a cooperationist
system that in fact works in a way that gives preference to majority
faiths.
A step away from cooperationism is the category of "accommoda-
tionist" systems.9 An accommodationist system, in Durham's classifi-
cation, "might be thought of as cooperationism without the provision
of any direct financial subsidies to religion or religious education. "98
An accommodationist regime might, for example, provide generous
exemptions from obligations that burden religious exercise, and
90 W. Cole Durham, supra note 4, at 1.
91 Id. at 19-20.
9 Id. at 20.
9 Id.
4 Id. at 20-21.
"Spain, Italy and Poland as well as several Latin American countries follow this pattern."
Id. at 21.
96 d.
97 Id.
8 Id.
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might also permit a considerable amount of religious symbolism in
public places or events.9
Further along the spectrum, Durham places "separationist re-
gimes.' These systems can range from those that "differ[] relatively
little from accommodationism," merely banning religious symbols
from public places and events, to more extreme forms that force re-
ligion to retreat from public life over a broad range of activity, per-
haps giving monopolies to the government in the provision of educa-
tion and social services. 1°1 Closely related to these more extreme
forms of separationism, Durham places "inadvertent hostility," which
exists when government acts with disregard for the negative effects of
its actions on religious groups or believers.
12
Finally, of course, government may engage in overt hostility or
persecution of religion, which can range from placing civil disadvan-
tages on believers or churches, to outright criminalization and im-
prisonment for religious activity. °3 We have, of course, seen similar
persecution earlier in our description of different types of church-
state relationships. But that, interestingly enough, did not occur in
those types of regimes that contained the least degree of unity of gov-
emnment and religion, but in those that insist on the most. And this,
more than the mere description of the various types of church-state
relationships, is at the heart of the most interesting conclusion that
Durham draws from his typology.
One might easily assume that there is a simple, positive correla-
tion between the degree of religious freedom in a society and the de-
gree of positive support that government gives to religion. But we
quickly see that this is not the case. An intolerant form of establish-
ment will be just as oppressive to minorities as will a government that
persecutes all religion; the difference will be limited to the question
of which groups are oppressed in each society.
Thus the surface tension in American constitutional law between
free exercise and establishment values may prove highly deceptive. If
religious freedom is minimized by either a theocratic regime or one
that actively persecutes religion, then it is maximized by avoiding, so
far as possible, either of these extremes.1 4 In other words, if religious
freedom is the ultimate goal, it can best be achieved by incorporating
both free exercise and establishment values.
99 Id
100 d. at 21-22.
101 Id. at 22.
102 Id at 22-23.
03 Id. at 23.
104 Professor Durham sets forth a model in which accommodation is the polar opposite of
both persecution and absolute theocracy, both of which represent the complete absence of re-
ligious freedom. See id. at 23.
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We may be able to assume that religious freedom is the ultimate
goal of the religion clauses of the First Amendment, °5 but how true is
that of the constitutional or statutory approaches of other nations?
Clearly, religious freedom is not a value that is universally endorsed.
A number of non-western nations quite openly strive to impose some
degree of theocracy, providing, at most, some minimal degree of tol-
erance for religious dissent. But the international community has
made several attempts to define religious freedom and include it in
the catalog of recognized human rights.
In the aftermath of World War I, the Covenant of the League of
Nations required that states that had been granted mandates by the
League to govern territories and prepare them for self-governance
guarantee freedom of conscience and religion.1a 7 Following World
War II, the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, '0m which includes Article 18:
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion;
this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom,
either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to
manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and obser-
109
vance.
The most significant international instrument focusing specifically
on the question of religious freedom is the United Nations Declara-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimina-
tion Based on Religion or Belief,n1 adopted by the General Assembly
in 1981. The Declaration begins with these broad provisions:
ARTICLE 1
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion. This right shall include freedom to have a religion or whatever
belief of choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with
others, and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in wor-
ship, observance, practice and teaching.
Thus, while there was disagreement about just what religious liberty entailed, and about
the best way to protect it, religious freedom was the "core value" behind both the Free Exercise
and Establishment Clauses. SeeAdams & Emmerich, supra note 1, at 1598-1604.
106 Perhaps the most prominent current examples are some Islamic nations that explicitly do
not provide religious minorities the protections generally called for by international human
rights law. See generally ANNE. MAYER, ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS: TRADITION AND POLITICS 143-
61 (1991).
107 See generally Nathan Lerner, Religious Human Rights Under the United Nations, in 2 RELIGIOUS
HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECInVE LEGAL PERSPEGTIVES, supra note 4, at 79, 84. The
League of Nations provisions involving religion and conscience were part of a movement be-
tween World War I and World War II to adopt measures for the protection of national and cul-
tural minorities. Id
10 GA. Res. 217A(III), U.N. GAOR, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/811 (1948).
19 Id. Art. 18.
110 GA. Res. 36/55, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess. (1981).
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2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom
to have a religion or belief of his choice.
3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to
such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect
public safety, order, health or morals or the fundamental rights and
freedoms of others.
ARTICLE 2
1. No one shall be subject to discrimination by any State, institution or
group of persons or person on the grounds of religion or belief.I
These provisions were not adopted without significant dissent,"
2
and obviously not all nations adhere to, or even make a showing of
adherence to these mandates. Still, these documents are evidence of
significant international endorsement of the notion of religious free-
dom. It is also obvious that a significant number of nations have
made genuine efforts to implement principles of religious freedom.
The European and North American participants in the Conference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe, in 1989, issued the Conclud-
ing Document of the Vienna Follow-up Meeting of Representatives of
the Participating States, which included a detailed elaboration of
the specifics of religious freedom, as understood by western govern-
ments. Principles 16 and 17 of the Document state:
16. In order to ensure the freedom of the individual to profess and
practice religion or belief the participating States will, inter alia,
16a take effective measures to prevent and eliminate discrimination
against individuals or communities, on the grounds of religion or belief
in the recognition, exercise and enjoyment of human rights and funda-
mental freedoms in all fields of civil, political, economic, social and cul-
tural life, and ensure the effective equality between believers and non-
believers;
16b foster a climate of mutual tolerance and respect between believers
of different communities as well as between believers and non-believers;
16c grant upon their request to communities of believers, practicing or
prepared to practice their faith within the constitutional framework of
their states, recognition of the status provided for them in their respec-
tive countries;
16d respect the right of religious communities to establish and maintain
freely accessible places of worship or assembly, organize themselves ac-
II Id- Arts. 1-2.
1 Particular problems were presented by the objection of some Islamic nations to the rec-
ognition of the right to change one's religion, and the related rights to proselytize or carry on
missionary activities meant to cause others to change their religion. See Lerner, supra note 107,
at 87-88, 115-16.
13 See Durham, supra note 4, at 37-43 (stating that the principles that were considered were
concrete religious liberty norms that deserved worldwide acceptance).
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cording to their own hierarchical and institutional structure, select, ap-
point and replace their personnel in accordance with their respective re-
quirements and standards as well as with any freely accepted arrange-
ment between them and their State, solicit and receive voluntary and
other contributions;
16e engage in consultations with religious faiths, institutions and or-
ganizations in order to achieve a better understanding of the require-
ments of religious freedom;
16f respect the right of everyone to give and receive religious education
in the language of his choice, individually or in association with others;
16g in this context respect, inter alia, the liberty of parents to ensure the
religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their
own convictions;
16h allow the training of religious personnel in appropriate institutions;
16i respect the right of individual believers and communities of believ-
ers to acquire, possess, and use sacred books, religious publications in the
language of their choice and other articles and other materials related to
the practice of religion or belief;
16j allow religious faiths, institutions and organizations to produce and
import and disseminate religious publications and materials;
16k favorably consider the interest of religious communities in partici-
pating in public dialogue, inter alia [sic], through mass media.
17. The participating States recognize that the exercise of the above
mentioned rights relating to the freedom of religion or belief may be
subject only to such limitations as are provided by law and are consistent
with their obligations under international law and with their interna-
tional commitments. They will ensure in their laws and regulations and
in their application the full and effective implementation of the freedom
of thought, conscience, religion or belief.
1 14
Anyone familiar with American constitutional law will note that
this extensive list of aspects of religious freedom does not contain any
explicit prohibition on government establishment of religion. This is
not surprising. Although the constitutions of some European nations
expressly proclaim the separation of church and state,"5 or at the very
least, neutrality on the matter of religion,"6 other European states
that endorse the Vienna Declaration's commitment to religious free-
14 Id. at 37-38.
115 Se eg., Constitucicao da Republica Portuguesa [Constitution] art. 41(4) (Port.) (1982);
Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej [Constitution] art. 82(2) (POL) (1982). Other European
nations declare themselves as secular states. See, e.g., La Constitution [CONST.] art. 2 (Fr.)
(1958).
16 See, e.g., Art. 44.22, Constitution of Ireland, 1957.
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dom have formally established churches,1 7 or at least recognize that
one religion is regarded as having a unique place in the nation's his-
tory or culture."8
The Vienna Declaration lacks the status of enforceable law; the
European Convention on Human Rights, however, provides a
mechanism for aggrieved citizens to bring their claims before the
European Court of Human Rights. ' 9 Article 9 of the Convention
adopts, almost word for word, the conscience and religion provisions
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and relig-
ion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and free-
dom, either alone or in community with others and in public or in pri-
vate, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and
observance.
2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to
such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a demo-
cratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public
order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms
of others.120
The application of these provisions by the European Court has
been mixed. In Kokkinakis v. Greece,'' the European Court held that a
criminal conviction of alehovah's Witness for illegaljproselytizing was
a violation of Article 9. 2 And in Darby v. Sweden,'2 the Court held
that a non-member of the established Swedish Lutheran Church was
entitled to an exemption from a tax that supported the Church, to
the extent that the tax supported religious rather than broadly chari-
table activity.1 4
W See, e.g., Kataetatiko [Constitution] art. 3 (Greece) (1975) (establishing the Eastern Or-
thodox Church); Kongerget Norges Grundlov [Constitution] art. 2 (Nor.) (1814) (establishing
the Evangelical Lutheran Church). The Church of England is the established church in Eng-
land, pursuant to the Act of Supremacy. SeeAct of Supremacy, 1 Eliz. I, c.1 (1558).
118 See, e.g., Constituci6n [C.E.] [Constitution] art. 16(3) (Spain) (1978) (mandating the
State is to maintain the appropriate relations of cooperation with the Catholic Church and
other denominations).
n9 See T. Jeremy Gunn, Adjudicating Rights of Conscience Under the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights, in 2 RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECrIVE: LEGAL PERSPECIVES, supra
note 4, at 305-30.
120 Id. at 308.
121 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 18 (1993).
122 Id.
12 187 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1990). Darby and Kokkinakis are discussed at length in Gunn,
supra note 119, at 316-25.
The European Commission, the body that initially evaluates complaints under the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights, found that Article 9 was violated by the requirement that a
dissenter pay a tax earmarked for specifically religious activity. Upon review, the Court agreed
that the tax on Dr. Darby was improper, but based its ruling on the fact that he was denied an
exemption from the tax because he was only a part-time resident of Sweden, whereas full-time
residents were entitled to claim exemption as dissenters. See Gunn, supra note 119, at 316-18.
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But in a number of other cases, the Court and the Commission
l2
have rejected claims that an individual or group was exempted from a
legal obligation generally applicable to the community.16 In these
cases, the reasoning of the Court in applying the balancing test of
Section 2 of Article 9 is quite reminiscent of the United States Su-
preme Court's analysis of free exercise claims in Smith' 7  Even in
Kokkinakis, the Court did not hold that proselytizing could never be
punished, but rather that Greece had failed to justify the conviction
at issue.12
Perhaps more notably, the European Court has never suggested
that a government may not privilege an established faith.'29 Thus, the
existence of government support and even a system of taxing mem-
bers of the established church for that church's support is unchal-
lenged. And beyond the question of financial support, some observ-
ers have noted that the European Court and Commission grants
more deference not only to established religions, but also to claims by
members of "mainstream" religions.'3' Thus, in the view of the Euro-
pean Court, individual and minority rights of religious freedom do
not necessarily imply government neutrality among religions. And
just as clearly, these rights do not imply government neutrality be-
tween religion and irreligion. When the dissenting Evangelical Lu-
theran Church in Sweden challenged mandatory religious education
in Swedish public schools conducted under the auspices of the estab-
lished Swedish Lutheran Church, the European Commission negoti-
ated a settlement granting Evangelical Lutherans an exemption.l
1
When an atheist sought a similar exemption from the same law, the
Commission dismissed the claim as "manifestly ill-founded." 132
12 See the discussion of the respective roles of the Commission and the Court as the adjudi-
cative bodies under the European Convention on Human Rights in Gunn, supra note 119, at
305-06.
126 See discussion and cases cited in Gunn, supra note 119, at 313-15.
12 Smith v. Employment Div., 494 U.S. 872 (1990); see supra notes 78-82 and accompanying
text.
128 See Gunn, supra note 119, at 324-25. Gunn notes that "the Court did not question the le-
gitimacy of the Greek anti-proselytism law as a whole." Id at 325.
129 "[A] 'State Church system cannot in itself be considered to violate Article 9 on the Con-
vention. In fact, such a system exists in several Contracting States and existed there already
when the Convention was drafted and when they became parties to it.'" 19- at 312 (quoting
Darby v. Sweden, 187 Eur. Ct. H.R (ser. A) (1990)).
IS Gunn finds that, with only two exceptions, "the European Commission always denied ap-
plications from religions that could be called 'new,' 'minority,' or 'nontraditional.'" Id- at 311.
For further details, see the list of such case, id. at 311, n.28.
13' Karnell and Hardt v. Sweden, 1971 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. 676 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.).
13 Angelini v. Sweden, App. No. 10941/83, 51 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 41, 49 (1987).
Both Angelini and Karnel, and similar instances of the European Commission rejecting claims
by adherents of minority religions are discussed by Gunn, supra note 119, at 311-12.
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The experience of the European Court and Commission suggests,
then, that a legal system that affirms individual rights of religious
freedom but does not prohibit state establishment of religion will
show some degree of respect for the principle that coercion cannot
be used to compel or prohibit belief, but will not take offense at une-
qual state treatment of different religions. Perhaps, though, this cau-
tious application of religious freedom principles is at least partially a
consequence of an international body exerting restraint in framing
rules governing different societies with different histories concerning
the relationship of church and state. An examination of a single na-
tion's experience with a constitutional affirmation of religious free-
dom but no prohibition of a religious establishment might produce a
somewhat different picture. If a purpose of our examination is to
draw conclusions that might shed light on the proper interpretation
of religious freedom in the United States, we would be well-advised to
choose a nation that shares many of the cultural and legal values of
the United States. And so, we will now turn our attention to the re-
cent experience of Canadian courts in dealing with these issues.
III. FREEDOM OF RELIGION UNDER THE CHARTER IN CANADA
Canada stands somewhat between the United States and Great
Britain in both its history regarding church-state relations and its po-
sition on the role of courts in protecting individual rights from abuse
at the hands of other branches of government. For a former British
colony, but one that achieved independence in a peaceful way, and in
stages over time,13 rather than by violent revolution, this is unsurpris-
ing.
As a British colony, Canada was familiar with the practice of for-
mal religious establishment practiced in the United Kingdom,' 34 but
because of the religious diversity caused by the significant presence of
francophone and largely Catholic Quebec, a strong form of single-
denominational establishment was hardly a practical option.1  In-
stead, we might expect government to support religion, but not to
limit that support to a single denomination.
133 A series of enactments shifted sovereign power from Britain to its former colony: the Co-
lonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, 28 & 29 Vict., c. 63 (Eng.), the British North America Act, 1867,
30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (Eng.), and the Statute of Westminster, 1931, 22 George V, c. 4 (Eng.).
1' For an overview of the history and present status of religious establishment in the United
Kingdom, see Peter Cumper, Religious Liberty in the United Kingdom, in 2 RELIGIOUS HUMAN
RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECIVE: LEGAL PERSPECnIES, supra note 4, at 205-41.
13 Issues of federalism, and particularly the question of the degree of autonomy that Quebec
should have in order to retain its distinctive culture, have long been the most prominent issues
in debates over Canadian constitutional reform. See DAVID MILNE, THE NEW CANADIAN
CONSTITUTION 46-103, 135-64 (1982).
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With respect to judicial protection of individual rights, Canada
inherited the British tradition of parliamentary supremacy. The
original Canadian constitutional documents3 did not provide for ju-
dicially enforceable individual rights that would override legislative
decisions.137 In the years following World War II, however, pressure
mounted for the adoption of a bill of rights that would have constitu-
tional status, and empower courts to invalidate inconsistent legisla-
tion. And so, when the government of Prime Minister Trudeau em-
barked on the task of constitutional revision in 1980, a key
component was the incorporation of a charter of rights into the con-
stitutional framework.'"
Thus, the first thirty-four sections of the Constitution Act of 1982
comprise the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Canada's first consti-
tutionally entrenched individual rights provisions.'3 9 In empowering
courts to override national or provincial legislation inconsistent with
the Charter, Canada has taken a step in the direction of the system of
judicial review long present in the United States. Still, significant dif-
ferences remain. While the list of protected rights and freedoms
largely resembles those protected by the United States Constitution,
there are some differences.'4 But the most significant differences be-
tween the Charter and the rights language of the United States Con-
stitution go beyond the enunciation of any particular right. First, the
Charter explicitly provides for a form of judicial balancing, rather
than suggesting that rights are absolute. Section 1 of the Charter
provides that the rights contained in the Charter are guaranteed
"subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 1 41 An even
1% Seesupranote 133.
137 Canadian courts were empowered to invalidate legislation found to exceed the powers of
either the national or provincial governments and invade the sphere of the other under the
division of power called for by Canada's federal structure. Such decisions could indirectly ex-
pand the scope of individual rights. The Supreme Court of Canada has, for example, invali-
dated provincial regulations involving speech or religion on the grounds that those matters
were within the exclusive control of Parliament. See, e.g., Switzman v. Elbling [1957] S.C.R. 285,
288; Reference re Alberta Statutes [1938] S.C.R. 100, 132-35.
ss See generally MII.NE, supra note 135, at 23-46.
9 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (Eng.) [hereinafter
Canada Act, 1982].
140 For example, the Charter has no equivalent of the Second Amendment right to bear
arms, nor does it contain a "takings clause." Section 7 of the Charter, which comes closest to
the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, provides that "life, liberty and security
of the person" (omitting "property") may not be taken away "except in accordance with the
principle of fundamental justice." Canada Act, 1982, supra note 139, § 7. But Section 26 of the
Charter, in language reminiscent of the Ninth Amendment, states that "[t]he guarantee in this
Charter of certain rights and freedoms shall not be construed as denying the existence of any
other rights or freedoms that exist in Canada." IM § 26.
141 Canada Act, 1982, supra note 139, § 1.
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more striking difference from American law is contained in Section
33. Except with respect to voting rights,4 mobility rights,'4 3 and lan-
guage rights, 44 this section provides that regardless of any judicial de-
termination that a piece of national or provincial legislation violates
the Charter, Parliament or the provincial legislature may expressly
declare that the legislation "shall operate notwithstanding a provi-
sion.., of this Charter."' 4 Such a declaration is to be effective for
five years, and may be re-enacted. 46 In other words, while courts are
empowered to invalidate legislation as violation of the Charter, those
decisions, unlike those in the United States, are not necessarily fi-
nal. 47 A degree of parliamentary supremacy persists. While Section 1
and Section 33 are interesting and important contrasts to the United
States constitutional framework, they will not be the subject of much
discussion here. Instead, we will focus on Section 2, which deals with
the same subject matter as the First Amendment, but not in precisely
the same way. Section 2 provides:
Everyone has the following freedoms:
(a) freedom of conscience and religion;
(b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including free-
dom of the press and other media of communication;
(c) freedom of peaceful assembly; and
(d) freedom of association.'4 8
Subsections (b), (c) and (d) deal, in somewhat more detail, with
the same freedoms as the speech and press clauses of the First
Amendment, 149 but with respect to religion, we can see an obvious
4 See id. §§ 3-5 (referring to the "Democratic Rights" contained in the Canada Act).
143 See id. § 6. Mobility rights, generally similar to the "right to travel" held to exist in the
United States, protect the right of Canadian citizens to enter and leave Canada, and to take up
residence in any province.
144 See id. §§ 16-22. Language rights were among the most sensitive issues under considera-
tion during the framing of the Charter. See MILNE, supra note 135.
145 Canada Act, 1982, supra note 139, § 33.
1 Id Since elections for Parliament and provincial assemblies must be held at intervals of
no longer than five years, see Canada Act, 1982, supra note 139, § 4(1), the five year limitation
limits a single assembly's power to preserve its Section 33 override decision in a way that will
bind future legislators.
147 Section 33, with its denial to Canadian courts of the final word on constitutional issues,
has been and continues to be perhaps the most widely debated part of the Charter. See
CHRISTOPHER P. MANFREDI, JUDICIAL POWER AND THE CHARTER: CANADA AND THE PARADOX OF
LIBERAL CONSTIrrTIONALISM 199-211 (1993) and the sources cited therein.
143 Canada Act, 1982, supra note 139, § 2.
14 The First Amendment of the United States Constitution makes no explicit reference to
freedom of association, but the United States Supreme Court has found such a right implicit in
the amendment. See, e.g., Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 520 U.S. 567 (2000) (holding that a
state law permitting non-party members to vote in a party primary election against the wishes of
the party would violate the party members freedom of association); Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale,
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contrast. The Charter protects "freedoms of conscience and relig-
ion," but does not seek to limit government establishment of religion,
at least explicitly. How significant will this omission be in differentiat-
ing the scope of religious freedom in Canada from the scope of the
freedom in the United States? In the nearly two decades since en-
actment of the Charter, Canadian courts have dealt with a number of
religious freedom claims quite similar to claims involved in United
States cases. While we might expect that, given the textual and his-
toric differences between the two nations' constitutional postures to-
ward church and state, outcomes would differ significantly, in fact,
resolution of a number of issues has been quite similar.
The first significant decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in-
terpreting the Charter guarantee of freedom of conscience and relig-
ion was R. v. Big M Drug Mart.O° Big M, charged with selling goods on
Sunday in violation of the Lord's Day Act,15 challenged that Act as a
violation of Section 2(a). In analyzing this religious freedom case,
ChiefJustice Dickson relied on concepts that American lawyers would
associate more readily with Establishment Clause cases than with Free
Exercise Clause cases. Initially, the Chief Justice found it significant
that the Act, in his view, had the purpose of promoting Sunday wor-
ship, rather then the secular purpose of merely providing a uniform
day of rest.5 2
Dickson then discussed the meaning of "freedom of religion," and
focused on non-coercion and equal treatment as essential compo-
nents of the right. In discussing coercion, the Chief Justice used lan-
guage that is more reminiscent of Justice Kennedy than Justice
Scalia:ss
Freedom can primarily be characterized by the absence of coercion or
constraint. If a person is compelled by the state or the wvill of another to
a course of action or inaction which he would not othenvise have chosen,
he is not acting of his own volition and he cannot be said to be truly
free .... Coercion includes not only such blatant forms of compulsion as
direct commands to act or refrain from acting on pain of sanction, coer-
cion includes indirect forms of control which determine or limit alterna-
tive courses of conduct available to others.
TM
520 U.S. 640 (2000) (holding that a state law prohibiting discrimination on grounds of sexual
orientation cannot be applied to violate Boy Scouts' freedom of association).
M [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295.
151 R.S.C., ch. L-13 (1970). With some exceptions, the Act generally prohibited commercial
activity on Sunday. See Big MDrug Mart [1985] 1 S.C.R. at 301-02.
152 After examining the history of the Act in BigMDrugMar [1985] 1 S.C.R. at 316-28, Chief
Justice Dickson concluded that "[a] finding that the Lord's Day Act has a secular purpose is, on
the authorities, simply not possible. Its religious purpose, in compelling sabbatical observance,
has been long-established and consistently maintained...." Id at 331.
153 See supra notes 51-60 and accompanying text.
154BigMDrugMar4 [1985] 1 S.C.R. at 336-37.
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Thus, despite the fact that the Act does not actually compel wor-
ship or belief, the Chief Justice found it to be coercive. Dickson con-
tinued, in language that makes coercion sound almost indistinguish-
able from Justice O'Connor's concept of endorsement:55
To the extent that it binds all to a sectarian Christian ideal, the Lord's
Day Act works a form of coercion inimical to the spirit of the Charter and
the dignity of all non-Christians. In proclaiming the standards of the
Christian faith, the Act creates a climate hostile to, and gives the appear-
ance of discrimination against, non-Christian Canadians .... The theo-
logical content of the legislation remains as a subtle and constant re-
minder to religions minorities within the country of their differences
with, and alienation from, the dominant religious culture.'5
In addition to this expansive view of the non-coercion principle,
Chief Justice Dickson also stressed that freedom of religion includes
the right to have one's religion treated equally with other beliefs:
"[a] free society is one which aims at equality with respect to the en-
joyment of fundamental freedoms .... The protection of one relig-
ion and the concomitant non-protection of others imports disparate
impact destructive of the religious freedom of the collectivity."'5
The Attorney General of Alberta, in defending the Lord's Day Act,
stressed the absence of any establishment clause in the Charter, and
contended that this omission meant that no statute that did not actu-
ally impede one's religious exercise could violate Section 2 (a). 15 This
argument was rejected, however: Chief Justice Dickson noted that
"establishment" and "free exercise "are not two totally separate and
distinct categories. ' 9 Indeed, Dickson continued, "neither 'free ex-
ercise' nor 'anti-establishment' is a homogeneous category; each con-
tains a broad spectrum of heterogeneous 
principles."'
A final point of interest in Big M is Chief Justice Dickson's insis-
tence that this synthesis of non-coercion and equality principles im-
plicit in freedom of religion does not merely protect those who ex-
press religious sentiments. "Equally protected, and for the same
reasons, are expressions and manifestations of religious non-belief
and refusals to participate in religious practice." 6' In holding the
Lord's Day Act unenforceable, the Canadian Supreme Court invoked
a number of principles and concepts that are a familiar part of
American Establishment Clause jurisprudence; namely, the purpose
and effect of the statute in question, and the principles of non-
155 See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
156 Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 1 S.C.R. at 337.
,5 Id at 336-37.
15 Id. at 339.
159 Id. at 339-40.
160 Id. at 340.
161 Id. at 347.
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coercion and equal treatment of religions, and of religion as opposed
to irreligion, tojustify its conclusion.
The significance of purpose and effect, concepts criticized by
American critics of the Lemon test,62 in Canadian religious freedom
jurisprudence became evident shortly after Big M. In 1986, the Ca-
nadian Supreme Court refused to invalidate the Ontario Retail Busi-
ness Holidays Act6 and its limitation on Sunday retail business. The
Act prohibited retail business on "holidays," defined as including
Sundays and a number of other holidays, some but not all of which
are of religious significance.16e The Act also contained a significant
exemption from the prohibition on Sunday retail business for small
retailers who were closed on the preceding Saturday. 1&
In light of these differences with the Lord's Day Act invalidated in
Big M, the Canadian Supreme Court was able to hold that whatever
burden the Ontario Act placed on religious freedom could be justi-
fied under the balancing test called for by Section 1 of the Charter.' 6
However, unlike Big M, the Court accepted the fundamentally secular
purpose of the statute, and, especially in light of the statutory exemp-
tion, found the negative effect on religious freedom to be sufficiently
minimized.see
No church-state issue in the United States has aroused more pas-
sion than the question of prayer in public schools;1ee it should not
come as a great surprise that this issue presented itself to Canadian
courts as well. Section 28(1) of Regulation 262 issued under On-
tario's Education Act 69 provided that the public elementary school
day would be opened or closed with the recitation of the Lord's
Prayer and a Scripture reading.1 0 Parents could request exemptions
for such recitation for their children, but the parents of children at-
tending Sudbury public schools, feeling that the peer pressure ex-
erted on their children not to exempt themselves made this practice
a violation of the freedom of religion, sought a ruling that the regula-
tion was invalid as a violation of Section 2 (a). The Ontario Court of
Appeals sustained the challenge, despite the absence of a non-
establishment provision in the Charter.
162 See supra notes 43-57 and accompanying text.
13 Retail Business Holidays Act, 1LS.O., ch. 453 (1980).161 Id 2 (1).
IS Id §3(4) (a).
16 R. v. Edwards Books and Arts, Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713, 716-17.
167 Id
168 See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court cases on school
prayer).
Education Act, R.S.O., ch. 129 (1980); R.R.O. Reg. 262, s.28(1).
171 Zyiberberg v. Sudbury Bd. of Educ., [1988] 52 D.L.R. 4th 577.
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The court found that the availability of an exemption for dissent-
ing students did not eliminate the element of compulsion and coer-
cion from the practice. In language that could easily have fit into any
of the American school prayer cases, the court explained:
The three appellants chose not to seek an exemption from religious ex-
ercises because of their concern about differentiating their children from
other pupils. The peer pressure and the class-room norms to which chil-
dren are acutely sensitive, in our opinion, are real and pervasive and op-
erate to compel members of religious minorities to conform with major-
ity religious practices.
172
The Board of Education defended the system of school prayer
partly on the basis that the exercises actually would have a positive
benefit on children who are religious minorities, in that they would
have to confront and learn to deal with their difference from the ma-
jority.17 The court rejected this argument, which has been proposed
in American school prayer cases as well,' with the comment that
"[t]his insensitive approach... not only depreciates the position of
religious minorities but also fails to take into account the feelings of
young children. '
Dissenting Judge Lacourci~re argued that the presence of an ex-
emption for unwillinq upils eliminated the element of coercion that
was present in Big M, and further argued that the reasoning of the
majority, so close to American school prayer cases, was inappropriate
when applying the principles of a document that did not include the
equivalent of the Establishment Clause.' 7  In light of Canadian his-
tory, the reference to God in the Preamble of the Charter,', and the
absence of an explicit non-establishment provision, Lacourci~re
found that the Canadian Constitution contemplates "a bridge be-
ln Id. at 591.
17 Id. at 592.
174 The court rejected the argument that those objecting to the practice must prove actual
"harm to individual pupils." Id.
MId. at 592-93.
J76 judge Lacourci~re stated:
In contrast to the legislation impugned in Big M, it is clear that s.28 does not seek to
compel participation in exercises with a religious component by all public school chil-
dren. I agree that indirect forms of coercion may result in a Charter violation, but what-
ever may be the indirect effect of the regulation, it cannot reasonably be suggested that
its purpose is to compel participation in these exercises when the exemption is cast in
such broad terms.
Id at 604 (Lacourci~re,J., dissenting).
7 'The relevance of American cases to the issue of the constitutional permissibility in Can-
ada of state aid for religion is limited by the fact that there is no express equivalent of the estab-
lishment clause in s. 2(a) of the Charter." Id. at 608 (Lacourci&re,J., dissenting).
1-7 The Preamble begins: "Whereas Canada is founded upon principles that recognize the
supremacy of God and the rule of law .... " Canada Act, 1982, supra note 139, quoted in Zylher-
berg52 D.L.R. 4th at 609 (Lacourci~re,J., dissenting).
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tween church and state rather than a wall of separation." 1 9 These ar-
guments, however, did not sway the majority.18 0
In 1990, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that a program of relig-
ious education in public schools of Ontario violated the Charter. 81 In
deference to increased sensitivity to religious pluralism, Ontario had
modified its program of public school religious education to make it
somewhat less focused on Christianity and more inclusive of other re-
ligious perspectives.' As was the case with public school prayer, par-
ents could seek exemption from religious education for their chil-
dren. 3 The court, however, still found a violation of Section 2 (a).
The court found that even in its modified form, the Ontario relig-
ious education program was not merely an objective survey of the be-
liefs of world religions, or a presentation of commonly held moral
values, but was clearly meant to promote Christian belief as norma-
tive.'8 2 Drawing on the language and reasoning of Big Ma5 and Zylber-
berg,182 the court dismissed the argument that the availability of an ex-
emption for parents of unwilling children was sufficient to negate the
presence of coercion.1 7 Once again using language that could easily
fit into American Establishment Clause cases, the Ontario court
found that "there are ways of encouraging the development of young
people in public school of high standards of character, ethical ideals,
and an understanding of moral values, without trespassing on the
personal religious beliefs which they have learned at home or in their
separate places of worship." 12
While American courts have consistently rejected attempts to
conduct school prayer, the Supreme Court has been more permissive
concerning religious invocations at the beginning of meetings of
1,'9 Zylberberg, 52 D.L.Rt 4th at 609 (Lacourcire,J., dissenting).
18O "[T]he absence of an establishment clause in s. 2(a) does not limit the protection it gives
to freedom of conscience and religion." Id. at 595.
Is] Canadian Civil Liberties Ass'n v. Ontario (Education Minister), [1990] 65 D.L.R 4th 1.
182 The detailed regulations, providing for two one-half hour periods of religious instruction
per week, are set forth in Canadian Civil Liberties Association. See id. at 5-6. The court noted that
"[o]riginally the curriculum of the board was exclusively Christian in form," but in recent years,
"the curriculum did contain references to other faith." ld at 7-8.
183 SeeRLPLO., Reg. 262, s. 28(10) (1980), cited in Canadian Civil Liberties Association, 65 D.L.R
4th at 6-8 ("In the 1986-87 school year, approximately 124 pupils out of 8,100 [in Elgin County]
were excused from religious education programs at the request of their parents.").
184 The court noted that while the curriculum had evolved from being openly directed at in-
doctrinating Christian views to include some reference to other world religions and some non-
religious moral teachings, it was still heavily weighted toward Christianity. In addition, the em-
phasis with respect to non-Christian religions was historical and descriptive, but with respect to
Christianity, much more was included concerning theory and belief. Id. at 28-39.
18 Seesupra notes 150-61 and accompanying text.
186 Seesupranotes 169-75 and accompanying text.
187 Canadian Civil Liberties Ass'n, 65 D.L.1L 4th at 23-25.
t Id. at 40-41 (quoting the Report of the "Mackay Committee," Committee on Religious
Education in the Public Schools of Ontario, Report (1969), at 21).
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public bodies. 89 But the Ontario Court of Appeal cited Justice Bren-
nan's dissent on this point'9° in holding that the recitation of the
Lord's Prayer by the mayor and council of the town of Penetanguish-
ene at the beginning of each council meeting infringed the freedom
of religion of non-Christian residents who wished to attend the open
meetings.' 9'
The court found it "clear that the purpose of the recitation of the
Lord's Prayer at the opening of council meetings is to impose a
Christian moral tone on the deliberations of council."'9 While the
town maintained that an adult would feel no more than trivial coer-
cion from the recitation, the court found no meaningful distinction
between this case and Zylberberg. Although children may be more
vulnerable than adults, "U]ust as children are entitled to attend pub-
lic schools and be free from coercion or pressure to conform to the
religious practices of the majority, so everyone is entitled to attend
public local council meetings and to enjoy the same freedom." 93
The court was unimpressed with the argument that longstanding
tradition should insulate the prayer from scrutiny; it is here that Jus-
tice Brennan is cited to the effect that changing times and attitudes
can render a practice once offensive to no one "highly offensive to
many persons, the deeply devout and the nonbelievers alike."' 94
However, the court did strongly suggest that a brief non-sectarian
prayer might be an acceptable alternative to the identifiably Christian
Lord's Prayer.' 95
These cases could all easily fit into the mainstream of United
States Establishment Clause jurisprudence. There is, however, one
aspect of Canadian church-state constitutional law that is clearly dif-
ferent from the American model. Canada has had a long history of
government financial support for religious, as well as secular, schools.
This is unsurprising in light of not only the British history of estab-
lished religion, but also the close connection between religion, lan-
guage, and culture that has been so much a part of Canada's attempt
to unite English and French speaking communities while allowing
them to retain their own identities.9
189 See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 795 (1983) (holding that religious invocation at the
opening of state legislative session did not violate the Establishment Clause).
See id at 795-822 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (maintaining that religious invocation at the
opening of state legislative sessions violates the Establishment Clause).
191 Freitagv. Town of Penetanguishene, [1999] 179 D.L.R. 4th 150, 164.
1W ld. at 157.
193 Id. at 162.
e4 Id at 165 (quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at 817 (Brennan,J., dissenting)).
1 Freitag, 179 D.L.R. 4th at 166.
19 See generally MILNE, supra note 135, at 46-103, 135-64.
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Section 93 of Canada's original constitutional document, the
Constitution Act of 1 8 67 ,197 grants exclusive control of education to
the provinces, and also preserves the rights and privileges of denomi-
national schools existing by virtue of statutes in effect at that time.
The provision was interpreted narrowly; in 1928 it was held that the
provinces had broad power to determine the degree of public fund-
ing of religious schools. In 1984, when the government of Ontario
sought to expand public funding for Catholic schools, previously ex-
tended only to grade 10, to include all secondary school grades,"8 the
enactment was challenged as a violation of the newly enacted Char-
ter.'9
The challengers alleged that this funding, not available to all relig-
ions, violated the principle of equal treatment found in Section
15(1), as well as the freedom of religion guarantee of Section 2(a).2w
The Canadian Supreme Court did not disagree with the contention
that, standing alone, Section 15(1) would seem to prohibit provincial
aid to religious schools, but went on to hold that the Charter clearly
did not have the effect of overriding Section 93 of the Constitution
Act of 1867, which specifically empowered the provinces to choose to
fund religious schools.2' While government funding of religious
schools is an accommodation that clearly distinguishes Canadian
church-state jurisprudence from that of the United States, the impli-
cation of the reasoning behind the Canadian Court's affirmation of
Ontario's funding is that were it not for the specific language and his-
tory of Section 93 of the Constitution Act, and the Charter language
specifically stating that the Charter is not to abrogate "any rights or
privileges guaranteed by or under the Constitution of Canada in re-
spect of denominational, separate or dissentient schools,"202 Section
15(1) of the Charter would bar such funding.2 3
19 British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c.3 (Eng.) (renamed Constitution Act of
1867), § 93.
198 Bill 30, An Act to Amend the Education Act, Stat. Ont. 1986, c.21.
9 In reAn Act to Amend the Education Act [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1148.
= See id at 1166 (arguing that providing benefits to Roman Catholic schools that are not
available to other religious schools violates the equality guarantee in Section 15(1) of the Char-
ter). Section 15(1) of the Charterreads, "Every individual is equal before and under the law and
has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in
particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex,
age or mental or physical disability." Canada Act, 1982, supra note 139, § 15.
201 See id. at 1196 ("The Charter cannot be applied so as to abrogate or derogate from rights
or privileges guaranteed by or under the Constitution.").
Canada Act, 1982, supra note 139, § 29.
20 See In reAn Act to Amend the Education Act, [1987] 1 S.C.R1 at 1197 (stating that Section
29 of the Charter "was put there simply to emphasize that the special treatment guaranteed by
the constitution [of 1867] to denominational, separate or dissentient schools, even if it sits un-
comfortably with the concept of equality embodied in the Charter because not available to other
schools, is nevertheless not impaired by the Charer").
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Thus, the Canadian constitutional law of church-state in the era of
the Charter presents us with some differences, but many remarkable
similarities, to the American position on the same issues. Is it possi-
ble, then, to learn something from this experience with a constitu-
tional document that lacks a specific prohibition of government es-
tablishment of religion that might nevertheless shed some light on
the proper interpretation of the scope of the First Amendment's Es-
tablishment Clause?
IV. WHAT CAN CANADIAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM CASES TELL US ABOUT
THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE?
Any inquiry into what foreign court insights and decisions inter-
preting their own constitutions can provide for the interpretation of
the United States Constitution might be dismissed as having no value.
Although it is common for the courts of other common law nations
to draw on American cases, and cite them as persuasive authority,2 it
has been quite uncommon for American courts to cite the decisions
of the courts of other nations in interpreting the provisions of United
States law or the United States Constitution. When Justice Breyer re-
cently referred to the example of other federalist nations to support
his dissenting opinion in a case presenting Tenth Amendment ques-
tions,2 Justice Scalia's majority opinion explicitly rejected the con-
tention that the cofistitutional experience of other countries could be
relevant in an inquiry involving the United States Constitution.
206
But there are strong reasons not to ignore foreign precedent, at
least where it comes from nations with reasonably similar legal sys-
tems, and where that precedent seeks to vindicate values held in
common. Especially when dealing with provisions of the Bill of
Rights, it is difficult to believe that the Framers doubted that they
were endorsing rights which would and should eventually be re-
20 See, e.g., Law Society of Upper Canada v. Skapinker, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 357, 367 ("The courts
in the United States have had almost two hundred years experience... and it is of more than
passing interest to those concerned with these new developments in Canada to study the expe-
rience of the United States courts."); R. v. Rahey, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 588, 639 (stating "[1]t is natu-
ral and even desirable for Canadian courts to refer to American constitutional jurisprudence in
seeking to elucidate the meaning of Charter guarantees that have counterparts in the United
States Constitution .... "). But see Rahey, [1987] 1 S.C.R. at 639 (warning that courts "should be
wary of drawing too ready a parallel between constitutions born to different countries in differ-
ent ages").
2Z See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 976-78 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (suggesting
that the experience of other countries may "cast an empirical light on the consequences of dif-
ferent solutions to a common legal problem").
2W See id. at 921 n.11 (commenting that comparative analysis with other countries may be
relevant when writing a constitution, but not when interpreting one).
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garded as universal.2 And when those rights become widely ac-
cepted in the international community, debate over their scope be-
comes both inevitable and salutary.
As we have seen, a basic commitment to religious freedom has be-
come a widely accepted international norm, one that is embraced by
all western democracies.m Andjust as the conception of the scope of
that freedom evolved in nineteenth century America from bare tol-
eration of dissenters to, at the very least, equal treatment of all faiths,
western democracies have traveled the same path.2 This has been
true even in England, where the formal establishment of religion per-
sists. 210 When we combine this basically similar attitude toward relig-
ious freedom with a common law system that includes a written con-
stitutional commitment to that freedom and the power of judicial
review, as in Canada, it would seem that we have a very useful source
of comparison with United States law.
And this is particularly so where our goal is not to contend that
United States courts should simply follow the reasoning of another
nation's judiciary, but rather to propose that the textual and histori-
cal differences between Canada and the United States on this point
suggest that American courts should go beyond the non-
establishment baseline that exists in Canada. With this justification of
the entire inquiry having been stated, we can now pose the question
of what the Canadian religious freedom cases can tell us about the re-
ligion clauses of the First Amendment.
The first obvious lesson that can be drawn from the Canadian ex-
perience is that the concepts of non-establishment and free exercise
are clearly not two distinct ideas, but rather two aspects of a single
commitment to religious freedom. This is not a new idea in Ameri-
can jurisprudence; the fact that the Framers of the First Amendment
expected the religion clauses to work in harmony has been frequently
noted.2 n Still, in the United States, a religious freedom case is almost
207 For a discussion of the impact of natural rights theory on the founding generation, see
Thomas C. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary
Tlwught, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843 (1978). For a discussion of the influence of natural law and the
"law of nations" on the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, see DANIEL A. FARBER &
SU7ANNASHERRY, A HISrORYOF THE AMERICAN CONSrITUI-ION 258-71 (1990).
2W See supra notes 107-20 and accompanying text.
On the matter of this "Lockean revolution in religious liberty," see Durham, supra note 4,
at 7-12 and the sources cited in the notes therein.
210 See Cumper, supra note 134.
21 For example, Professor Kurland's proposal that the religion clauses should be synthesized
into a principle that would provide that "religion may not be used as a basis for classification for
purposes of governmental action, whether that action be the conferring of rights or privileges
or the imposition of duties and obligations." PHILIP KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW 18
(1962). See also Stephen M. Shapiro, Note, Toward a Uniform Valuation of the Religion Guarantees,
80 YALE LJ. 77, 78 (1970) (positing that since both government aid and government restraint
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inevitably classified as either a Free Exercise or an Establishment
Clause case, and once that classification is made, concerns underlying
the other clause are pushed aside.
This phenomenon can be seen to work in both separationist and
accommodationist directions. Cases brought challenging public
prayer, easily classified as Establishment Clause cases, might be seen
differently if they were conceived of as concerning the rights of those
who want to publicly express their faith.12 In contrast, cases involving
free exercise claims can overlook the possibility of troubling govern-
ment favoritism toward religion created by generous exemptions, ei-
213ther judicially or legislatively created, from obligations imposed on
others, granted to believers.
Each clause, were it to stand alone, contains clear elements of the
other. The freedom of free exercise could be abrogated by govern-
ment forcing one to adhere to an official set of beliefs as easily as by
government stifling expression of one's own. Of course, one aspect
of the classic religious establishments that the First Amendment
framers must have had in mind was the active suppression of dissent-
ing belief.2 4 Still, as history has shown, the dual aspects of the First
Amendment commitment to religious freedom do create a significant
degree of tension. Government's position toward religion should be
neither too warm nor too cold.
To describe the process of attempting to resolve this tension as
"balancing" may be unwise. The normal conception of balancing in-
volves the weighing of different interests against each other.2 1 5  But
here, the interest behind each clause is the same-that is, the preser-
vation of freedom of conscience and religion. Perhaps a better way
pose an identical threat to the underlying value of religious liberty, "a standard of uniform
strictness" should be applied to establishment and free exercise cases).
212 See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 323 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., dis-
senting) (arguing in favor of permitting student-led invocations at high school football games
by suggesting that the Court's decision impinges on free exercise values).
213 Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in Employment Div. v. Smith could be seen as protec-
tive of Establishment Clause values, as well as merely limiting free exercise values. See Smith, 494
U.S. 872 (1990). Yet the opinion is unconcerned with the possible Establishment Clause prob-
lems posed by the availability of legislative exemptions to those religious adherents who can
muster majority support, and the unavailability of such exemptions to those who cannot. See id.
at 890.
214 At the time of the framing of the Bill of Rights, the English establishment, while begin-
ning to ease its restrictions on Protestant dissenters, was still far from granting full freedom to
those outside of the Church of England. See Cumper, supra note 134, at 207-11.
215 As applied to the religion clauses, see Derek H. Davis, Resolving Not To Resolve the Tension
Between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, 38J. CHURCH & STATE 245 (1996) (expressing
the tension between the clauses and the need to balance them can lead to maximizing religious
liberty); Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 YALE L.J. 1611, 1644
(1993) ("The Free Exercise Clause works as a counterweight to the Establishment Clause; it
gives back what the Establishment Cause takes away.").
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to describe the process is as one of adjusting the degree to which
government may or must act or refrain from acting in order to fur-
ther that interest. However described, though, courts called upon to
address religious freedom cases must decide just how sensitive to be
to the twin problems of excessive cooperation and excessive distance.
The degree of sensitivity to each of these dangers is unlikely to be
quite the same in different societies; differences in history and cul-
ture will come into play. But, on the other hand, in societies with a
sincere underlying commitment to religious freedom, these differ-
ences are not likely to be drastic.
At first glance, we might expect that the Canadian Charter, in the
absence of an explicit commitment to non-establishment, would be, if
not entirely insensitive to establishment concerns, at least far less sen-
sitive to them than American jurisprudence. But Canadian cases, as
we have seen, do not bear this out. Rather, they demonstrate that a
reasonably strong sensitivity to establishment concerns is implicit in
the commitment to religious freedom. And this brings us to the
question posed in this Article's tile: in light of this, is the Establish-
ment Clause redundant? More specifically, could we expect Ameri-
can constitutional law to adopt at least the non-establishment princi-
ples put forward by the accommodationist wing of the Supreme
Court even if the First Amendment contained no Establishment
Clause, but merely protected free exercise? And if that is so, is that
sufficiently troubling to cast serious doubt on the accommodationist
view of the Establishment Clause?
It would seem that the view of the Establishment Clause put for-
ward by strong accommodationists on the Court and in the academy
consists basically of three points. First, the Establishment Clause is
violated by government coercion of religious belief or expression.
Strong accommodationists would define coercion to include only
those restraints described by justice Scalia as coercive, not the psycho-
logical coercion that troubles Justice Kennedy.t 6 Second, the clause
prohibits government policy that favors one religion over another,
but not government policy that favors religion over irreligion.1 7 And
finally, the clause prohibits some forms of direct government finan-
cial aid to churches, but by no means prohibits all forms of aid to re-
ligious institutions. Would these principles exist as aspects of consti-
tutionally protected free exercise even if there were no Establishment
Clause?
The first of these three Establishment Clause principles can easily
be seen to also be implicit in the concept of free exercise of religion
or, to use the Charter term that hardly seems substantively different,
216 See supra note 51 and accompanying text
217 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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freedom of religion. As the Canadian cases demonstrate, the free-
dom to profess one's own beliefs necessarily implies that government
will not coerce the profession of different views. Further, these cases
go beyond Justice Scalia's narrow definition of coercion to include
psychological coercion. As both supporters and critics of Justice
Kennedy's definition of coercion have noted, this more sweeping
view of coercion is quite close to Justice O'Connor's definition of en-
dorsement.218 In other words, not only is it clear that Justice Scalia's
non-coercion principle is implicit in the Free Exercise Clause, even in
the absence of an explicit non-Establishment Clause, it is quite possi-
ble thatJustice O'Connor's non-endorsement principle is as well.
Canadian courts, as we have seen, also find that no explicit non-
Establishment Clause is required to impose on government the duty
to treat all religious beliefs equally.219 This, of course, is not entirely
independent of the non-coercion principle as defined by Chief Jus-
tice Dickson in Big M "coercion includes indirect forms of control
which determine or limit alternative courses of conduct available to
others."2' 0 Providing benefits to one religion and not another "im-
ports disparate impact destructive of... religious freedom...."2'
Once again, the concept of freedom to follow one's own religion,
standing alone, implies at the very least equal treatment of all relig-
ion. And Dickson went further in Big M to state that the principle of
equal treatment had to be extended to non-believers.2
Extending the equal treatment principle beyond the command to
treat all religions equally to include equal treatment of religion and
irreligion may be more a consequence of the practical difficulty of
defining terms than anything else. History contains numerous in-
stances of new religions being branded as atheistic because of their
rejection of prevailing concepts of God.2 Most Americans would
probably maintain that an irreducible core of religion is belief in a
transcendent supreme being, but at the same time Buddhism, which
218 See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
219 See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
220 R. v. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, 336-37.
221 Id at 337.
z Id. at 347.
In his book, DOES GOD EXIST: ANANSWERFORTODAY, Hans Kfing wrote:
Socrates was condemned to death as atheos, as "godless." But he had by no means re-
jected any kind of God; he had rejected, like many other educated Greeks, only the cus-
tomary veneration of the gods of the Greek polis. Atheism properly so called does not
deny merely a plurality of gods or merely a particular way of worshipping God or even
simply a personal, "theistic" God. It denies any God and any divine reality ....
HANS KUNG, DOES GOD EXIST: AN ANSWER FOR TODAY 189 (Edward Quinn trans., 1980). Kung
discusses eighteenth and nineteenth century thinkers who put forth conceptions of God that
are radically different from that of a single, transcendent being actively intervening in human
affairs, but contends that these conceptions, such as deism, the "basically pantheistic attitude of
Spinoza, the philosophy of Fichte, cannot be truly regarded as atheistic." Id. at 127-61.
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lacks such a concept, is easily thought of as being a religion.24 Is pan-
theism, or any of the traditional nature religions, which do not dis-
tinguish nature from God, a religion? If so, does that make material-
ism a religion as well? And ultimately, does not an unbending
atheism share many of the aspects of religion? It can serve as an or-
ganizing principle for one's ethics and belief system, and ultimately,
its underlying assumptions are neither provable nor disprovable by
rational argument.225
American courts have been called upon to classify beliefs and
practices as religious or merely secular in a number of contexts.22 r
Perhaps the most prominent cases involved claims of conscientious
objector status from the Vietnam era military draft22  The Selective
Service Act provided for exemption from military service for those
whose consistent pacifism was grounded in religious belief, but spe-
cifically excluded those who based the same position on secular ethi-
cal belief.2 8 The Supreme Court, perhaps mindful of the serious Es-
tablishment Clause implications of granting coveted exemptions to
only those who professed traditional, conventional, religious beliefs,
drew on the writings of Paul Tillich and other liberal theologians to
hold that religious beliefs included any set of ultimate concerns that
animated an individual's life in essentially the same manner as tradi-
tional religious beliefs would.29
With the distinction between religious beliefs and merely philo-
sophical beliefs blurred, it would seem almost inevitable that the
adoption of a principle that government must treat all religions
equally would compel the further conclusion that, as Justice Dickson
stated in Big M, belief and unbelief must also be accorded equal
treatment.zo
If non-coercion and equal treatment are implicit in the concept of
free exercise, it might be thought that the independent force of the
Establishment Clause can be found in the principle of no direct gov-
224 In Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), the Supreme Court recognized that there are
.religions ... which do not teach what would generally be considered a belief in the existence
of God... [including] Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism, and others."
Id. at 495 n. 1.
SeeKUNG, supra note 223, at 329 ("All proofs or arguments of the eminent atheists are cer-
tainly adequate to raise doubts about the existence of God but not to make God's non-existence
unquestionable .... Atheism, too, lives by an undemonstrable faith .... ").
See e.g., Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that the "naturalist"
organization MOVE does not qualify as a religion); Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979)
(finding that Transcendental Meditation is considered to be a religion).
2V See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163
(1965).
Seeger, 380 U.S. at 164-65.
SId. at 180-83.
00 SeeR. v. BigM Drug Mart, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295.
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ernment financial aid to religions. With respect to government aid to
denominational schools, we do see a difference between the accep-
tance of such aid in Canada and its limitation in the United States.23
And surely the practice of European governments of imposing man-
datory obligations on citizens to support established churches out of
general or special tax revenue2 was one of the paramount aspects of
establishment that offended eighteenth century American separation-
ists.
233
Still, even here there is some convergence between American con-
stitutional law, with an Establishment Clause, and Canadian law,
without one. Drawing on the equality principle, the United States
Supreme Court recently held that government support of activity of
religious organizations that is analogous to the work of similarly sup-
ported secular organizations is permissible, and perhaps even manda-
tory.2 And while direct government aid to religious schools is still
generally prohibited, indirect assistance through the provision of tax
credits or vouchers to parents may well be given the Supreme Court's
blessing in the near future.25 At the same time, the Canadian Su-
preme Court has approved government support of religious schools,
but has done so on the basis of a specific constitutional provision
permitting such aid.2 This suggests that in the absence of such a
specific constitutional provision, the inequality that results from fund-
ing religious school systems that have substantial constituencies and
leaving others with only the alternative of public schooling would
present constitutional problems.237 It should also be noted that the
231 See su/ra notes 196-201 and accompanying text.
2 Government financial aid to preferred or to all recognized churches is still fairly common.
See Durham, supra note 4, at 20-21.
See generally Douglas Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid To Religion: A False Claim About Original
Intent, 27 WM. & MARYL. REv. 875 (1986).
2M See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (finding that public school teachers may pro-
vide remedial educational services on premises of religious schools); Rosenberger v. Rector &
Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (holding that a student publication at state uni-
versity that promotes religious views is entitled to equal university funding with other student
publications). See also Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (upholding a program lending
educational materials and equipment to public and private schools). The fourJustice plurality
in Mitchell set forth probably the strongest endorsement of "nonpreferential" aid to religion
ever found in a Supreme Court opinion:
If the religious, irreligious and areligious are all alike eligible for government aid, no one
would conclude that any indoctrination that any particular recipient conducts has been
done at the behest of the government .... If the government is offering assistance to
recipients who provide, so to speak, a broad range of indoctrination, the government it-
self is not thought responsible for any particular indoctrination.
MitchelU, 530 U.S. at 809-10.
See Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding voucher program
unconstitutional), cert. granted, 533 U.S. 976 (2001) (No. 00-1751).
Z6 See supra notes 196-203 and accompanying text.
37 See supra notes 200-03 and accompanying text.
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Canadian Supreme Court has held that provinces are under no obli-
gation to fund denominational schools; they may, as Ontario has,
choose to organize schools on the basis of language communities
rather than denomination.
What, then, does all this mean? First, it clearly indicates that to
seek to define the boundaries of the non-establishment principle by
inquiring into the specific history behind the Establishment Clause
itself may be a serious mistake. To do so can easily lead to the con-
clusion that the clause was meant only to ban specific aspects of then
prevailing religious establishments, such as taxation for the support
of an established church, and nothing else. This can, in turn, lead to
the conclusion that if a government practice was not considered to be
one of these unique aspects of eighteenth century religious estab-
lishments, then that practice presents no constitutional problem. But
this ignores the non-establishment principles implicit in the concept
of religious freedom, or, in the words of the First Amendment, free
exercise.
We might ask ourselves what the law of church-state in the United
States would be if the First Amendment had merely spoken of free
exercise, and had contained no Establishment Clause. One might as-
sume that there would then be no constitutional limitation on the
types or degree of support that government might provide to a relig-
ion, or to religion in general. But that assumption is a consequence
of seeing the religion clauses as, while related to each other, pursuing
different interests, one beneficial to government sensitivity to relig-
ious concerns, the other hostile.
The Canadian decisions under Sections 2(a) and 15(1) of the
Charter suggest a very different conclusion. Were American courts
called upon to interpret the content of a declaration of religious
freedom against a background of widely held western ideas of what
that freedom entails, it is likely that they, like their Canadian coun-
terparts, would recognize that the non-establishment principle, and
many of the specific conclusions that have been compelled by the Es-
tablishment Clause of the First Amendment would also be required
even in the absence of that clause.
Is the Establishment Clause, then, redundant? To a large extent,
yes. But that does not mean that it has no significance. Besides its
application to specific practices such as direct government funding, it
stands as a reminder that in adjusting the degree to which accommo-
dationist values may be pursued by government, close attention must
be paid to non-establishment concerns. Those who argue that the
First Amendment Establishment Clause is violated only by coercion
238 SeeAdlerv. Ontario, [1994] 116 D.L.R. 4th 1.
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narrowly defined, or by favoritism of one religion over another, and
not by favoritism of religion in general over irreligion, must confront
what would seem to be a paradox. For they are arguing that in a con-
stitutional system that specifically calls attention to the non-
establishment principles that are part of the overall concept of relig-
ious freedom, those principles should be applied less vigorously than
they are in a constitutional system that lacks an establishment clause.
